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ABSTRACT  
Since the beginning of the 1990s the public health care system in England has been subject to 
reforms. This has resulted in a structurally hybrid system of public service with elements of the 
market. Utilising a theory of new institutionalism this paper explores National Health Service (NHS) 
managers’ views on competition and cooperation as mechanisms for commissioning health services. 
We interrogate the extent of institutional change in the NHS by examining managers’ understanding 
of the formal rules, normative positions and frameworks for action under the regime of the Health and 
Social Care Act 2012. Interviews with managers showed an overall preference for cooperative 
approaches, but also evidence of marketisation in the normative outlook and actions. This suggests 
that hybridity in the NHS has already spread from structure and rules to other institutional pillars. The 
study showed that managers were adept at navigating the complex policy environment despite its 
inherent contradictions.     
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INTRODUCTION 
Studying the process of institutional change is one of the core preoccupations of scholars of public 
administration. Such processes are often elusive and their consequences are hard to predict. This 
paper explores the process of institutional change by analysing different actors’ views of the 
regulatory structures which guide commissioning of health care in the quasi-market of the English 
National Health Service (NHS) under the regime of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA 
2012).  
The efforts to instigate institutional change towards greater marketisation of the English NHS date 
back to the beginning of 1990s when the hitherto unified local health authorities were split into state-
owned purchasing organisations (or commissioners) acting on behalf of patients and state-owned 
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providers of healthcare for local populations (DH 1989; Paton 2014). Since then successive UK 
governments have enhanced elements of competition by introducing policies designed to increase 
diversity of organisational types of providers, allowing patient choice and commercialising the terms 
of procurement and contracting within the English NHS (DH 2005). Most recent reforms to the 
English NHS contained in the HSCA 2012 reinforced this direction of change by introducing formal 
legislation encouraging competition between providers. Overall, the process of institutional change 
has resulted in hybridisation of the NHS and utilisation of the market alongside the pre-existing 
political hierarchy as modes of social control (Allen et al. 2011).  
Health care is not the only public service sector that has experienced a shift towards marketisation in 
the UK since the 1980s. There has been a somewhat unreflective extension of the notion of consumer 
choice taken from private sector to social housing and education, despite big differences in the type of 
constraints characterising the quasi-markets in each field (Greener and Powell 2009). On the supply 
side, the provision of many public services has been supplemented by or outsourced outright to 
private and third sector organisations, for example in education (Goodman and Burton 2012) or 
‘welfare to work’ support (Rees et al. 2014).  
As a result of 25 years of market reforms, the NHS in England constitutes a structural hybrid featuring 
quasi-market structures, private and third sector providers, market regulators and some (albeit limited) 
consumer/patient choice (see e.g. Allen et al. 2011). However, the extent to which the encroaching 
marketisation has permeated mind sets and practices of NHS managers and clinical staff is debatable 
(Checkland et al. 2012; Mannion et al. 2009). This paper provides new empirical insights on this 
matter. 
The study reported here examined how managers in commissioning and providing organisations 
related to and dealt with the marketisation of NHS structures. The purpose of this paper is to report 
and analyse NHS managers’ attitudes to competition and cooperation in the NHS under the regime of 
the HSCA 2012. By analysing managers’ understanding of the rules, normative views and actions in 
respect of the mechanisms of competition and cooperation in the NHS, we interrogate the process of 
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institutional change  itself, together with the extent to which marketisation has become an internalised 
feature of commissioning practices. We find signs of marketisation in the norms and cognitive 
frameworks employed by some NHS managers. However rather than a wholesale market turn, they 
reflect creative incorporation of some market principles into everyday commissioning practices 
mostly favouring collaborative working. 
We view the HSCA 2012 as one event among many along the continuum of institutional change put 
in motion by the introduction of quasi-market at the beginning of the 1990s. Whilst adhering 
analytically to the longue durée perspective, in this paper we assess the role of the HSCA 2012 in the 
process of marketisation of the NHS as the most recent and controversial event (see e.g. Reynolds et 
al. 2012). 
We used a case study design selecting four local health economies in England. In each site we 
investigated the views on competition and cooperation of senior managers in both providing and 
commissioning organisations. Arguably, focusing on managers as ‘street level bureaucrats’ is key to 
detecting any ‘real’ institutional shifts in the NHS (Pettigrew et al. 1988). This is because they hold 
the power of either translating structural changes into practices or hampering such processes. We 
looked for signs of hybridity in their normative outlook and agentic dispositions, and explored how 
individual actors within organisations in different local contexts dealt with the structural hybridity of 
the NHS. By focusing attention on the level of individuals within the organisations the study 
contributes to the literature on diversity of normative and agentic responses to structural hybridity 
(e.g. Denis et al. 2015; Skelcher and Smith 2015; Waring 2015). The paper also addresses the 
currently under-researched empirical question concerning the extent to which hybridity occurs at 
different levels of analysis and in different institutional dimensions  (Denis et al. 2015). 
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE ON HYBRIDISATION OF THE NHS 
We chose Scott’s (2008) approach to new institutionalism to ground our analysis. Scott (2008: 48) 
views institutions as relatively resistant to change and “comprised of regulative, normative and 
cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability 
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and meaning to social life.” According to Scott the three institutional pillars both enable and constrain 
actors’ behaviour in distinctive ways. The regulative pillar refers to practices of rule-setting, 
monitoring, sanctioning and incentivising and encompasses a continuum from formal legislation to 
less formal rule making. The normative pillar includes both values – “conceptions of the preferred or 
the desirable” (Scott 2008: 54) and norms – the scripts outlining desirable goals and legitimate means 
of attaining them in the agentic pursuit of the elusive ‘what ought to be’. Finally, the cultural-
cognitive institutional pillar refers to the intersubjective processes and frameworks which enable 
sense making at the junction where the individual meets “external world of stimuli” (Scott 2008: 57). 
The robustness of an institution is strengthened when its three pillars – rules, norms and cognitive 
frameworks – work in harmony and reinforce each other. The institutional pillars may become 
misaligned when they “support and motivate differing choices and behaviours” of individuals and 
organisations (Scott 2008: 62). Each relationship between any two pillars can be characterised by 
alignment or misalignment creating a complex interplay between three pillars in a given case. Yet 
according to Scott (2008) even in cases of misalignment between pillars, the institutions have a 
natural tendency towards convergence, or internal consistency, over time. For instance, the 
weaknesses in regulative pillar such as ambiguous rules or ineffective sanctioning, instead of 
undermining the institution, may lead to interpretative searching for meaning to inform conduct, thus 
activating normative and cognitive elements which in turn maintain the stability of the institution 
(Scott 2008: 54).  In short, “institutions supported by one pillar may, as time passes and circumstances 
change, be sustained by different pillars” (Scott 2008: 54).   
Yet at the same time, Scott concedes that in some circumstances the misalignment between different 
institutional pillars (e.g. between normative and regulative or between regulative and cognitive) may 
result in institutional change or deinstitutionalisation, a process which may be sparked by weak laws, 
fragmentation of normative consensus, questioning of taken for granted assumptions or presence of 
competing institutional frameworks (Scott 2008). The process of deinstitutionalisation of existing 
forms is followed by a process of institutionalisation of new arrangements (Scott 2008). In this sense 
classic new institutional theory is sceptical about the ability of misaligned pillars to co-exist in the 
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long-term, treating them instead as catalysts for change or accommodation resulting in the domination 
of one logic.  
The phenomenon of misalignment between institutional pillars is akin to what other scholars have 
termed hybridisation of institutions, and which we see as a process of being imbued with, and 
operating under, conflicting principles or institutional frameworks. However, it has been shown that 
the concept of hybridisation itself is elusive and suffers from low explanatory power (Skelcher 2012). 
In each instance of ‘hybridisation’, spelling out the underlying phenomena and levels of analysis is 
required. For instance, Denis et al. (2015: 274) advocate studying hybridity at “multiple levels” going 
beyond the traditional focus on structure and governance. Despite such conceptual caveats, the 
phenomena underpinning ‘hybridisation’, such as “existence of plural normative frames (logics)” and 
multiple actor identities, have become common in many modern institutions (Skelcher and Smith 
2015: 12; Skelcher 2012).  
The process of structural hybridisation of the NHS has been progressing gradually over the last 25 
years through changes in the regulative pillar to enable operation of the quasi-market for clinical 
services. Policy makers saw value in market competition to drive up quality, efficiency and outcomes 
of clinical services. Using Scott’s (2008: 132-133) terms, the NHS has been on a receiving end of 
‘diffusion’ of neoliberal market logic implemented by successive UK governments. What remains 
unclear is the extent to which NHS professionals share the normative conviction about the benefits of  
market mechanisms for the NHS, or whether their shared frameworks for everyday practices have 
changed as a result of structural hybridisation.  
Checkland and colleagues (2012), utilising theories of new institutionalism, identified a lack of fit 
between the norms permeating the NHS, such as the focus on individual patients and seeing the NHS 
as a common enterprise, and the formal rules of commissioning pushing for greater marketisation of 
relationships between different actors within the health system. This suggests that hybridity instigated 
by marketisation of the NHS is present only at the level of structures whilst norms governing actors’ 
behaviour remain relatively unaffected. However, the authors point out that normative shifts may 
7 
 
occur in the future if market principles become more embedded in NHS culture. Other empirical 
studies find that hybridisation has already permeated the norms and culture of the NHS. For instance, 
Mannion and colleague (2009) found that the ‘clan’ culture bonded by loyalty and tradition, hitherto 
the most common type of  managerial culture within the NHS organisations, has been overtaken by a 
‘rational’ organisational culture bonded by competition and emphasis on winning market share.  
In line with Scott’s (2008) theoretical framework, one can envisage two types of organisational 
responses to changes in the NHS regulative pillar. The actors may appropriate such misalignment 
cognitively, mostly relying on organisational inertia and diverging in their responses. Alternatively, 
the misalignment may set in motion full scale institutional change characterised by adjustments in 
cognitive and especially normative pillars.  
FORMS OF COMPETITION AND COOPERATION IN THE NHS 
In order to assess the extent of shift towards marketisation in the normative and cognitive dimensions 
of the NHS we explored managers’ views on competition and cooperation in commissioning 
practices. Competition and cooperation are the two fundamental mechanisms of service procurement 
in the NHS and represent the tools for ‘getting things done’. Cooperation is closely related to co-
ordination through hierarchies, as opposed to markets, where competition is paramount. Thus, they 
are also associated with the two contrasting institutional logics of market and hierarchy. A mix of 
competitive and cooperative pressures is one of the core characteristics of the hybrid arrangements, 
which sit between market and hierarchy (Ménard 2004). 
Competition in the NHS is realised through several models. Competition for the market is a result of 
tendering processes whereby different providers compete to deliver a particular service. Competition 
within the market exists when a number of providers are accredited to provide a particular service and 
they compete to attract as many patients as possible. Examples of the former include tendering out of 
community health services, and the latter include the Any Qualified Provider (AQP) model of 
contracting and patient choice of elective secondary care.   
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Cooperation in the NHS is harder to define. There is a number of closely related terms such as 
collaboration, coordination, integrated care, networking and partnership. Integrated care implies the 
coordination of separate but interconnected components which should function together to perform a 
shared task (Kodner and Spreeuwenberg 2002). Cooperation can take place at a service, 
organisational or clinical level (Fulop et al. 2005). It can occur horizontally between providers of 
similar services, or vertically between different sectors (e.g. primary and secondary care). It also may 
include the process of planning necessary for ensuring efficient and comprehensive delivery of health 
care services. Commissioners are engaged in planning and monitoring provision of health care 
services. They need cooperation from providers in order to fulfil these tasks successfully. Thus 
commissioners have the dual objective of promoting cooperation between different providers in terms 
of clinical service delivery and fostering cooperation between providers and commissioners 
themselves for the purposes of strategic planning and ongoing monitoring of service provision.  
THE REGULATIVE PILLAR OF THE NHS - RULES, REGULATORS AND 
HIERARCHY  
 Formal rules guiding the implementation of the principles of competition and cooperation in 
commissioning health care services in the English NHS are complex and difficult to interpret. 
Although the rules about the use of competition in procurement and ensuring patient choice were in 
place prior to the HSCA 2012, the Act which came into force in April 2013 gave them statutory force 
(Sanderson et al. 2016).  
The Statutory Regulations that accompanied the Act state that commissioners have a duty to follow 
transparent procurement processes and to promote patient choice (SI 2013). Commissioners and 
providers are also prohibited from reaching agreements which restrict patient choice. The benefits of 
any potential mergers between providers have to outweigh the loss of competition and patient choice. 
Cooperation and integration is also envisaged in the Act.  
Under the HSCA 2012, Monitor (as the new economic regulator) has been given the most prominent 
role in interpreting the legal principles and advising the NHS on what behaviours are acceptable in 
terms of competition and cooperation (Monitor 2014; Monitor 2015a).  
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Monitor (2015b) maintains that delivering integrated care and complying with competition conditions 
are not mutually exclusive. It states that it is possible to design models of care that “give patients a 
choice of a provider, deliver care to individual patients in an integrated way, and enable competition 
between providers to provide services” (Monitor 2015b). However, it is the role of NHS 
commissioners, including local Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) led by General Practitioners, 
to ensure that the appropriate levels of competition and cooperation exist in their local health 
economies (HSCA 2012). 
When the HSCA 2012 came into force there was lack of clarity as to what these legislative changes 
mean for services on the ground. The rules were being interpreted on a case by case basis and 
regulators were vacillating between giving greater weight to competition and favouring cooperation.1   
Regulators are not the only actors influencing competition and cooperation in the NHS. The NHS is a 
hierarchical organisation with top down budget allocations and bottom up accountability flows. 
Despite the recent restructuring of commissioning functions, the hierarchical structure remains. Local 
commissioners need to justify their decisions to NHS England, which has overall commissioning 
oversight, which in turn is accountable to the Department of Health (Checkland et al. 2013). 
Similarly, policy guidance filters down the organisational hierarchy which can, depending on local 
circumstances, increase or decrease the urgency of certain messages before they reach local 
commissioners. 
Arguably the complexity introduced by the HSCA 2012 and subsequent guidance lies in the fact that 
cooperation and competition in the NHS can be understood both as means to achieve other policy 
objectives and as policy objectives in themselves. To complicate matters further, competition may 
serve as a tool for attaining greater cooperation and vice versa. For instance, commissioners may 
decide to follow a competitive procurement process to increase service integration. On the other hand, 
a situation may arise when cooperation may facilitate increased diversity of provision, as in case when 
                                                             
1 For more details on the impact of the regulatory regime following the HSCA 2012 see Sanderson et al. (2016). 
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NHS providers have to cooperate with new market entrants in order to maintain care pathways for 
patients. 
STUDY DESIGN AND METHODS 
In order to investigate how commissioners and providers dealt with the challenges of competition and 
cooperation in their local health care systems we selected four CCG areas across England. These 
constituted four case studies. The case study method enabled us to carry out an in-depth study of 
policy processes and their embeddedness in “real-life” contextual conditions (Yin 2009: 18). Case 
study sites comprised a mix of rural and urban health economies and were located in the North 
(CCG1, CCG3), Midlands (CCG2) and London (CCG4). Before commencing the field work we 
obtained university research ethics and NHS research governance approvals, as well as research 
permissions from each participating organisation. Between August 2013 and June 2014 we carried out 
thirty-three interviews with senior commissioners (13) and provider managers (20), including five 
with independent providers. All but one interviewed commissioner were senior level managers. 
Similarly, the majority of interviewed provider managers did not have a clinical background.  
Participants were asked about their understanding of policy and regulations regarding the use of 
competition and cooperation in commissioning NHS services. Commissioners were also asked about 
their actual use of competition and cooperation in managing the local health care system. Providers 
were asked about their experiences of competition and cooperation in the NHS.  
The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. Three authors agreed a thematic coding 
framework derived from the research questions, the literature on competition and cooperation, and the 
data. The major themes covered the understanding of policy set up including incentives to cooperate 
and compete, views on sector regulators, impact of the HSCA 2012 and the amount of local 
discretion; personal views on the role of competition and cooperation in the NHS system; and specific 
examples of competition and cooperation in the local context including the different rationales that led 
managers to adopt a particular solution in a particular case. The interviews were uploaded to NVivo 
and coded using the agreed coding framework by two authors who each coded half of the interviews. 
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The coding authors met periodically to check whether the coding framework was working well and to 
agree any necessary modifications. 
We obtained in-depth data on actors’ understandings of formal rules, their personal normative views 
about the role of competition and cooperation in the NHS and the ways of dealing with day-to-day 
commissioning dilemmas that the co-existence of principles of competition and cooperation posed. 
This dovetailed with the Scott’s (2008) tripartite analytical framework applicable to institutions. We 
used the framework to check whether our data showed any signs of hybridisation/marketisation in the 
normative and cultural-cognitive institutional pillars.  
SOURCES OF VARIATION BETWEEN PARTICIPANTS 
In the course of the fieldwork we observed some important variations between participating 
organisations. On the commissioning side, the case study sites varied in terms of the actual usage of 
competitive mechanisms in commissioning local services. No case study site utilised competition for 
major service reconfiguration, but all sites put out to tender at least one service as a result of a 
decision taken locally. In particular, commissioners in two sites (CCG2 and CCG4) had substantial 
experience of utilising competitive tendering, whilst CCG1 and CCG3 had very limited experience.  
In turn, providers faced different external pressures depending on the type of services they provided 
(acute hospital, community, mental health) and the type of pricing mechanism to which they were 
subject (cost per case or fixed budget). In particular, acute providers were more affected by 
competition within the market than for the market. In contrast, community and mental health 
providers were facing a prospect of their core services being subject to the competition for the market 
instigated by the commissioners. Some providers worked across a number of different CCGs and 
contracted with a series of different commissioning bodies, such as local authorities. This led to the 
providers encountering different commissioning styles. Private providers represented a different 
institutional paradigm focused on profit and rewards for shareholders, and they faced different 
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challenges than NHS providers.2 Overall, individual participants reflected on the role of competition 
and cooperation from their unique perspectives and spoke about issues that were especially important 
to them as actors in the system. Yet despite such differences many views on competition and 
cooperation were shared by both commissioners and providers. 
UNDERSTANDING OF FORMAL RULES 
The structural hybridity of the NHS, taken here as a starting point, is epitomised in its regulative pillar 
discussed above. Rules are important as they constrain and enable actors’ behaviour. Yet as Scott 
(2008: 54) concedes, in reality formal laws are sometimes ambiguous and “do not provide clear 
prescriptions for conduct.” Thus the rules have an impact on actors’ behaviour only after passing 
through the cognitive filter of an individual’s interpretation. In that sense, understanding of the rules 
crosscuts both regulative and cultural-cognitive institutional pillars. 
Ideally, a shared understanding of the ‘rules of the game’ is necessary to ensure a level playing field 
and procedural fairness. In this study, conducted under the regime of HSCA 2012, we did not find a 
shared understanding of the rules. Instead, we uncovered a widespread confusion about the rules on 
competition in the NHS. Most participants understood that not every clinical service had to be 
tendered but there was a requirement to justify why competitive procurement was not used. It was 
much harder to pinpoint when tendering ought to be conducted and why. Some commissioners 
thought that the decision to use tendering or not depended on whether the service was “extremely 
specialised” and could be provided only by a certain provider (Commissioner 4, CCG1, April 2014). 
Another commissioner (Commissioner 6, CCG1, November 2013) made a distinction between the 
expansion of existing services with good outcomes which, in their opinion, could bypass the 
requirement to procure; and setting up new services with new specifications, which ought to go to full 
tender.  
                                                             
2 In our conceptual framework private providers represent one of the signs of structural hybridity of the NHS. 
As such, the detailed analysis of their views falls outside of the scope of this paper. We report some private 
providers’ views merely to contrast and compare with NHS managers. 
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We don’t have to tender all services, there are exceptions.  But I think the default position is 
that we are expected to tender services, as a generality.  So we have to, I think, the 
expectation is that you will explain why you haven’t (Commissioner 1, CCG2, November 
2013)  
Some providers admitted not being able to keep up with the “dynamic” nature of the rules, and the 
lack of “nice neat answers” (Provider 1, NHS, acute, CCG1, April 2014). Their approach was to make 
judgements on a case by case basis by consulting most up to date guidance and taking legal advice. 
Providers noted that different commissioners interpreted the rules in different ways. This heightened 
anxiety on the part of commissioners about potential formal challenges from providers.  
Regulators were not helpful in clarifying the rules. They were not prepared “to put a line in the sand 
for something and say, this is our stance” (Commissioner 5, CCG1, April 2014). Whilst NHS 
commissioners were concerned about being challenged by Monitor for not following the competitive 
tendering route, one private provider also complained about a perceived lack of readiness on the part 
of the regulator to support competition. Overall, a sense of confusion and loss of direction prevailed 
amongst commissioners and providers. 
There’s no clear framework, so people have got misconceptions (...) there’s a huge 
misinterpretation, misconception, and I think what would really help would be some very 
clear guidance on what this is really all about, rather than it all being a bit cloak and dagger. 
(Provider 2, NHS, community and mental health, CCG3, November 2013) 
At the same time, some commissioners observed that the lack of clear top down guidance with regards 
to competitive tendering may be beneficial, as it allowed for local discretion. This can be contrasted 
with other policies on competition, such as AQP, over which they had little or no discretion. AQP 
policy mandated commissioners to open a number of community services to non NHS providers to 
stimulate competition within the market (Jones and Mays 2013). Although seen as a prescriptive 
policy, at the time of the fieldwork the pressure on commissioners to use AQP had eased. This shows 
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the fast changing stream of policy messages in the NHS whereby even those aspects of policy seen as 
coercive for a period of time can wane in national importance.  
Similarly, during the fieldwork some participants began to note a ‘watering down’ of the imperative 
to increase the levels of tendering and competition. Arguably, a change in the tone of policy discourse 
could be noted in the aftermath of the rejection of the proposed merger of two hospitals in Dorset in 
October 2013, which forced Monitor to reassess the way the merger review process was being 
handled by the competition authorities (Competition Commission 2013; see also Sanderson et al. 
2016). This merger rejection raised concerns among many that the competition regulations were 
detrimental to attempts to produce desirable reconfiguration of services.  
My understanding is that it’s now less of a requirement than it used to be … you have to show 
… value, which doesn’t necessarily mean that you have to put everything out to competition. 
(Provider 1, NHS, community and/or mental health CCG4, January 2014) 
According to participants, the HSCA 2012 did not have much impact on how they thought about 
procuring services, as the rules requiring them to consider competitive procurement were in place 
prior to the Act. As one commissioner put it “it was happening anyway, (…) the thought processes we 
go through have not changed for the last two or three years” (Commissioner 1, CCG3, August 2013). 
The provisions of the HSCA 2012 legitimised further the use of competition to procure clinical services. 
In that sense the HSCA 2012 was seen as another step in a long process of marketisation of the NHS 
which commenced over twenty five years ago. The main impact of the Act was observed in changing 
commissioning structures and fragmenting commissioning functions (between CCGs, NHS England 
and local authorities), making the system more complex. As a result of such fragmentation the HSCA 
2012 was perceived as unhelpful in enabling cooperation across local health systems by some 
interviewees.  
The process of marketisation of the NHS, reinforced by the HSCA 2012, resulted in competitive 
procurement being promoted as a legitimate tool of commissioning on a par with collaborative 
approaches. Yet the co-existence of commensurate but contrasting principles of competition and 
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cooperation created a sense of confusion amongst interviewees as to the overall policy direction and 
the general premise of the NHS commissioning system. One participant noted a “lack of clarity about 
the role of the market” in the NHS (Provider 2, NHS, acute, CCG2, March 2014). In their opinion it 
was difficult to pinpoint a consistent policy direction in this respect.  
It's almost like half the system wants there to be competition and half the system doesn't want 
it to be, and we're stuck in the middle, working out what we do and don't want. 
(Commissioner 3, CCG1, April 2014) 
Overall, commissioners and providers (including independent providers) found the rules confusing, 
hard to follow and potentially contradictory. Instead of a shared understanding of the rules, there was 
a shared sense of confusion, leading to divergent interpretations and organisational responses. The 
sense of a lack of clear policy direction and changing policy emphasis were also noted during the 
period of the fieldwork.  
NORMATIVE VIEWS  
Similar to rules, norms and values have an impact on actors’ behaviour. Whereas rules may undergo 
quick changes, norms tend to be internalised in the socialisation process and are more resistant to 
change (Scott 2008). In the functionalist tradition, shared norms and common values ensure stability 
of social order by legitimising behaviour which is consistent with normative expectations ascribed to 
social roles (Parsons 1951). The NHS normative platform rests on the principles of universal care, 
free at the point of delivery,  as well as on viewing different providers of care as a community of 
organisations sharing the belief in these fundamental principles and putting them above any other 
interests (Checkland et al. 2012). As shifts in a normative pillar are crucial indicators of embedded 
institutional change (see e.g. Caronna 2004), it is important to examine the normative element of the 
NHS health care system to ascertain to what extent the logic of marketisation permeated the system. 
We uncovered a whole spectrum of normative opinions about the place of competition and 
cooperation in the NHS. These ranged from great criticism of competition to approval of competition, 
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if treated as one of the tools at commissioners’ disposal to achieve certain desirable aims, rather than 
as a policy mandate.   
Some providers claimed that competition was unsuitable in the NHS as it inevitably led to 
fragmentation of services and adversely affected interdependent services.  
I think [competition] is inappropriate in the Health Service and I think there are too many 
interdependencies in the Health Service.  So the minute you start leasing a bit out somewhere 
else then you don’t think about the impact that has on all the other bits, or the whole and that 
increases costs. (Provider 3, NHS, acute, CCG4, March 2014) 
Yet some commissioners were more open to the idea of competition, provided competitive 
procurement was not imposed.  
As a commissioner you’ve got to have a variety of tools in the toolbox, competitive 
procurement is one of them … you certainly don’t want to rule out whole areas and say: 
“Well you can’t collaborate” or “You have to competitively procure” or “You must use 
AQP”.  All you’re doing … is shooting yourself in the foot.  So I think you keep as many 
options as you can.  (Commissioner 1, CCG2, November 2013) 
Some providers and commissioners saw potential benefits of transplanting some private sector 
principles to the NHS in order to increase efficiency, reduce costs and foster innovation, provided it 
was done in a carefully managed way. Another provider also called for a rebalancing of the negative 
attitudes towards competition as organisations were required by law to be mindful of both competition 
and cooperation, signalling a conformist stance. Not surprisingly, independent providers were 
enthusiastic about the place of competition in the NHS, emphasising the benefits of competition and 
private sector culture in terms of increasing efficiency, flexibility, innovation and streamlining 
services. 
Despite such views, there was an overall preference for a collaborative service development approach 
between commissioners and providers. Furthermore, participants noted that cooperation between 
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different actors in the system was essential for long term service reconfiguration projects such as 
shifting care out of acute settings into the community. Providers also reflected on the long history of 
cooperation in the NHS especially with regards to clinical pathways. All in all, tendering was often 
portrayed as a last resort option and not (yet) part of NHS culture. One commissioner noted it would 
take time and a cultural change for NHS commissioners to embrace tendering as “customary practice” 
(Commissioner 1, CCG4, November 2013).  
It was difficult to pinpoint any clear differences between the four case study sites in terms of their 
respondents’ normative outlook towards competition and cooperation. As we noted, commissioners 
located in the North (CCG1, CCG3) had less experience in utilising competition for commissioning 
services than those based in London (CCG4) and the Midlands (CCG2). The latter also spoke more 
favourably about the competition as a useful principle, which indicated a shift in their normative 
outlook. 
However, this finding did not extend to providers. In contrast to local commissioners, providers faced 
a more varied landscape having to deal with different commissioning bodies at the same time. The 
fact that two sites (CCG4 and CCG2) had greater experience of competition did not seem to warm 
their local providers to it. For instance, despite having to compete in the local market, community and 
some acute providers interviewed in London held distinctly anti-competition views. This alerts us to 
the fact that what people think does not necessarily correspond to what people do. The origins of 
normative views held at individual level are complex and cannot be explained fully by the variations 
in characteristics of local health economies such as provider configuration, geographical remoteness 
or past experience of competition.     
Although the study found that most interviewees preferred collaboration as a main method of solving 
local service delivery problems, especially in cases of complex service transformations, it was not the 
only normative position encountered. Some participants pointed out the benefits of competition when 
used in a non-prescriptive, creative way. This suggests that there is a greater variety of views in NHS 
managerial culture than one based on  the domination of a common NHS identity (Checkland et al. 
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2012). In fact we found that, given the contradictory and ambiguous rules which exposed actors to 
various risks, participants were preoccupied first of all with preserving their own organisation’s 
interests and identities. Overall, the findings suggest that the solidity of the normative framework 
underpinning actors’ practices within the NHS, although still distinctly pro-cooperative, has been 
somewhat eroded by pockets of pro-competitive thinking.  
CULTURAL-COGNITIVE FRAMES OF REFERENCE 
Participants also expressed a range of views which exposed the interplay between the three pillars of 
rules, norms and practices. In Scott’s (2008) analysis such elements represent the cultural-cognitive 
assumptions constraining and enabling action. These may include routine scripts for action, 
orthodoxies and common definitions of situation and represent cultural mores which have been 
internalised and filtered through individual cognition (Scott 2008: 56-59). Although analytically 
useful, we found Scott’s third pillar too narrow and too focused on preconscious elements adequately 
to describe what our participants told us. Our participants showed heightened awareness of various 
paradoxes and inconsistencies inherent in the system. Merely by talking about ‘taken for granted’ 
assumptions they exposed them and showed a high level of reflexivity. Participants elaborated on 
systemic barriers such as ambiguous rules and resource limitations which constrained the feasibility of 
certain actions. Therefore participants’ views are better described as representing various frames of 
reference and attempts at sense making.  
In order to deal with the dissonance introduced by the changes in the regulative pillar, organisations 
interpreted the rules in line with their local path dependencies. Commissioners on the whole were 
continuing to develop local commissioning plans in a ‘traditional’ service development mode, 
avoiding elements of competition. At the same time some worried that such an approach might be 
considered a “heresy” (Commissioner 1, CCG2, November 2013) by regulators and authorities higher 
up the hierarchy.  This shows that the NHS is a hierarchical organisation inasmuch as local managers 
defer to higher levels of authority in attempts to decipher policy messages and obtain approval of their 
plans.  
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In the light of the 2012 legislation, many participants pointed out the need for robust justifications for 
not tendering. Some were actively looking for such justifications for their current commissioning 
plans. In this sense commissioning was being carried out in defiance of regulatory policy rather than 
policy supporting commissioning choices.  
I’ve commissioned [a community service] from Trust X as a pilot and I’m thinking about how 
I’m going to do it and I’ve done that on a clinical governance issue, but really I should 
procure it and I’m dreading it. (Commissioner 6, CCG1, November 2013) 
On the other hand, some participants were sceptical about the role of formal rules in governing 
relationships within the NHS. They cited examples of tendering processes being abandoned without 
any consequences for the commissioners. Furthermore, providers were often reluctant to challenge 
commissioning decisions, even if they had clear basis for a challenge, in order to preserve 
relationships and avoid costly litigation.  
We made an argument to say that [community] services should be put out to tender.  The 
CCG decided that the process would be too disruptive for the community services and so 
decided not to do that, to leave them where they were. (…) Actually we could make a very 
good strong argument to Monitor to challenge it, (…) with a high likelihood that Monitor 
would overturn their decision.  Now we decided not to do that for a whole host of reasons 
(Provider 5, NHS, acute, CCG3, December 2013) 
This signals once again that the NHS commissioners and providers were not willing (or able) to adopt 
purely commercial principles due to the constraints of NHS quasi-market. Various supply-side 
constraints and political sensitivity surrounding provision prevent true competition from taking hold 
(Allen 2013).  A number of areas of provision – such as acute and primary care – seem to be excluded 
from attempts to instigate competition for the market on the basis of ‘unwritten’ rules. Private 
providers saw the limits of their involvement in the NHS due to the resource intensity of certain areas 
of health care provision (such as specialist acute care), existing barriers to market entry and concerns 
about profitability (see also Krachler and Greer (2015)). On the demand side, some interviewees 
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assumed that patients want to use their local hospital rather than exercise choice.  Yet others noted an 
increasing role of patient choice creating a “pull” for certain hospitals at expense of others (Provider 
4, NHS, acute, CCG1, June 2014). In practice, competition was seen as affecting only the margins of 
health service provision.  However even limited competition raised some concerns about the potential 
to destabilise existing service providers.  
Aside from the inadequacy of the rules, participants were also concerned about resource limitations. 
The tight financial situation of many NHS trusts meant that providers were looking for different ways 
to collaborate with each other in order to cut costs. In turn, CCGs did not have sufficient resources 
and organisational capacity to carry out numerous competitive procurement processes, even if they 
wanted to. Maintaining competition was accompanied by high transaction and upfront investment 
costs and was not viable within limited fixed budgets.    
Actually it is a massive resource [implication].  So I think we have to be very careful about 
which services we decide to procure and how many procurement processes we go through in 
any one year, because they are a massive drain on resources and in time and people. 
(Commissioner 3, CCG4, May 2014) 
Differing pricing and payment mechanisms drew a dividing line between community and mental 
health providers operating on fixed budgets, on the one hand; and acute service providers paid in 
accordance with the amount of care they provided, on the other. In addition to being more exposed to 
the competition for the market, some community and mental health providers felt frustrated about 
their inability to realise the benefits of competition within the market by increasing activity in respect 
of well-performing services. 
Dual incentives in the commissioning system meant that providers had to ensure the viability of their 
organisation in a competitive environment and at the same time had to cooperate with commissioners 
and other providers. Contrary to policy makers and regulators, participants on the whole were not 
convinced that the principles of competition and cooperation could coexist harmoniously. For 
instance, some providers became more cautious about cooperating with commissioners after the 
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services which they helped to redesign were put out to competitive tender. In another instance, 
commissioners used a threat of opening services up to competition in order to encourage greater 
cooperation between providers, which was the ultimate aim. Yet using competition as a ‘stick’   was 
seen as ‘aggressive’ by providers and had the potential to increase the level of distrust in the system. 
Overall, many noted that “two drivers [of cooperation and competition] can compete against each 
other” (Commissioner 3, CCG4, May 2014).  
Providers operating in different local contexts noted large differences between how different CCGs 
chose to interpret and implement policy on competition. Some commissioners chose not to use 
competitive procurement where services were working well, whilst others were tempted to make 
savings by putting services out to tender. Large amount of local discretion alongside duality of 
incentives and unclear rules of the game meant that providers were navigating a highly complex 
environment. Overall, one can argue that the existence of competition as a potential commissioning 
tool has decreased the amount of generalised trust between actors and made different NHS 
organisations more self-interested. This may have an adverse effect on collaborative working as 
various studies on partnerships in health and social care found that trust is one of the key components 
for successful collaboration (Cameron and Lart 2003; Dowling et al. 2004; Hunter and Perkins 2014).  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In terms of formal rules, the HSCA 2012 legitimised further the market principles within the NHS in a 
top down manner. However the new rules were not presented in a clear way and were overlaying 
rather than superseding the requirements for cooperation and integrated care. The policy messages 
regarding competition and cooperation in the NHS were characterised by certain fluidity. This created 
room for commissioners to use local discretion and to continue with the traditional ways of 
commissioning through partnerships and planning, whilst using or threatening to use competition.  
In terms of norms, we found a mix of opinions, from outright opposition to competition in the NHS to 
some acceptance of the role of competition as a commissioning tool. There was no united front 
against competition or identification with the NHS as a “common enterprise” (Checkland et al. 2012: 
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544). Instead participants were maintaining separate organisational identities and were focused on 
preserving their organisation’s viability. These findings suggest that some market principles had 
already slipped into NHS managerial culture resulting in an ambiguous normative framework.  
Finally, in terms of cognitive sense making, we found continuing preference for a cooperative service 
development mode of commissioning. However at the same time many commissioners acknowledged 
that competition was a useful ‘tool’ to have at their disposal. Although NHS providers were less 
enthusiastic about competition as a method to improve services than some commissioners, they were 
mindful that competition could be deployed and were prepared to act strategically. This undermined 
somewhat the trust between actors in the system. Commissioners and providers were grappling with 
resource limitations, service interdependencies, payment structure inequalities and presence of many 
‘unwritten rules’ about commissioning health services.  
According to Scott (2008) the robustness of an institution is ensured if all three pillars are aligned, 
whereas a mismatch requires some work to bring it back to fit the current institutional framework or 
may set in motion a process of deinstitutionalisation. Our analysis suggests that the confusion about 
the relative importance of cooperation and competition in the NHS was present in all three 
institutional levels. In other words, hybridity introduced by market logic was discernible not only in 
the structural aspect of the rules governing the system, but also in norms and cognitive sense making. 
Yet in our view, the signs of hybridisation in normative and cognitive pillars do not amount to a full 
scale deinstitutionalisation process but rather, as Scott suggested, the process of appropriation of 
market elements is under way as actors interpret the ambiguous rules and incorporate them into their 
practices in search for locally optimised solutions.  
More recent studies acknowledge that hybrid structures and logics may be more permanent than new 
institutional theory suggests, representing “enduring but unstable” features of modern institutions 
(Denis et al. 2015). We can speculate that the ambiguous rules may actually mitigate some of the 
misalignment between pillars. The hybridity in the NHS spread from structure and rules to other 
institutional pillars such as norms and cognitive dispositions. If hybridity is present within each pillar 
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(as this study showed) then the misalignment between pillars may be more fuzzy, and less pronounced 
than if inherent contradictions persisted between internally consistent pillars. In that sense the internal 
hybridity of institutional pillars may provide certain stability to a hybrid institution. 
This study has some limitations. The process of marketisation of the NHS is ongoing and the study 
represents a snapshot of views at a particular point in time and may not represent how actors will 
understand the system in the future. Furthermore, due to the fact that only four case studies were used, 
we were not able to quantify the prevalence of two co-existing logics of competition and collaboration 
in the NHS, focusing instead on the extent these logics had an impact on commissioning practices in 
particular locations.  
Scott’s (2008) framework was useful but had also some limitations. It appears that the cognitive-
cultural pillar does not capture well the thought processes and actions in institutions undergoing 
change. We found few taken for granted assumptions. Instead managers were highly reflective about 
their environment and often contesting it rather than routinely replicating it. It seems that Scott’s third 
pillar does not recognise sufficiently the role of actors’ reflexivity in navigating complex and 
sometimes contradictory environments leaving little room for agency (Denis et al. 2015; Lowndes 
1996).  
Notwithstanding this, we found the institutional framework on the whole helpful in explaining 
changes affecting the NHS. Arguably, the institutional framework has advantages over the notion of 
hybridity because it offers insight into how organisations deal with hybridity by exposing the 
interplay between and within different institutional pillars.  
It has also advantages over using a metaphor of “public sector diaspora” as an analytical device for 
studying reforms of the NHS in England (Waring 2015: 345). A metaphor of diaspora implies a one-
way migration from a public sector culture to a private sector culture with subsequent ‘resettlement’. 
Contrary to this, our findings suggest that the public sector is already permeated by the overarching 
principles of neoliberalism. If one ascribes to a non-essentialist view of culture and agrees that no 
‘pure’ culture types exist, then no movement between such ‘pure’ types is possible and the so called 
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in-between space occupied by the ‘diaspora’ does not exist. We found evidence of market 
mechanisms at the levels of rules, norms and actions characterising NHS commissioning.   
Although in this cross-sectional study we uncovered the signs of hybridisation in norms and cognitive 
frameworks adopted by the NHS managers, they do not amount to a full scale marketisation of the 
NHS. This is due to limitations imposed by the quasi-market and the fact that the rules remain 
ambiguous leaving different avenues for interpretation. This ambiguity allows managers in some 
instances to disregard the rules on competition. Yet some participants ascribed some normative value 
to competition and adopted it into their cognitive frameworks as a tool for instigating change in 
provider behaviour. Overall we discerned some infiltration of market principles in all three pillars, but 
not a full scale paradigm shift. The fundamental change in the normative pillar seems less likely (at 
least for the time being) given the diminished urgency of national policy messages about the use of 
competition since the publication of the ‘Five Year Forward View’ policy document in October 2014 
(NHSE 2014). 
Our study has some implications for policy makers. Local commissioners should be allowed to make 
their own decisions about which modes of commissioning are most appropriate in their particular 
circumstances. Setting up nationally imposed rules about what mechanisms must be used is unhelpful 
(and probably will not be adhered to). It appears that in most circumstances, the use of cooperative 
modes of coordination is likely to be more appropriate. At the same time for the sake of efficiency and 
transparency, it is important to clarify the rules of the game for local actors. As the NHS continues to 
be a predominantly hierarchical institution, the clarity of the rules under which local commissioners 
operate is crucial for the effectiveness of the local health economies.  
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